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CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE 1894

BY

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THESIS

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UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY H. L. Chang
ENTITLED China-Japanese Relations
Since 1894

BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts

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THE HISTORY OF THE

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Preface.

In preparing the present thesis, the writer has divided the material into four chapter, the first one discussing the causes and the results of the Chino-Japanese war, the second, the usurpation in South Manchuria, the third taking up the subject of the Japanese in Shangtung Province, and the last setting forth the the truth concerning 21 demands. All the matter in support of the arguments of these chapters has been taken from official documents and authorities, American, Japanese, and Chinese. Since very few or rather, almost none of the Chinese Books bearing on the present subject have been rendered into English, the writer has been obliged to translate some of the material for his use, and takes the whole responsibility for the versions presented.

H. L. Chang.

Chapter I.

The Chino-Japanese War.

The Chino-Japanese War in 1894 was one of the most significant occurrences in the modern history of the Far East, marking the beginning of the decline of China on one hand, and the rise of Japan on the other.

The fundamental cause of the war can be said, in a word to have been due to the rivalry between the two nations for the supremacy over Korea. In order to treat the cause of this great war in the Far East more accurately, it is necessary to go back to the history of the relations of Korea with these two powerful neighbors.

Korea is a mountainous peninsula between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, with an area of about 84,000 square miles, and with a population of 10,500,000. It was for many years a dependency of China.¹ In 1122 B.C. the Chinese Emperor, Chow-wu-wang, created Kiga as the King of North Korea. The Kiga's Dynasty lasted nearly a thousand years. During the Tang Dynasty of China (A. D. 618-907) the whole northern part of Korea was directly administered by the Chinese Government. About the hundred years after this time, Japan received an impetus in direction of Buddhism from Korea, but "there is not a shred of proof to uphold the claim that Korea was a tributary to that power,"² as the Japanese claimed. In 1265, the Korean soldiers with the Mongol conquerors invaded Japan twice; but they were defeated. In A. D. 1591,

1. Mitchell's Geography. p. 89.

2. Hulbert: The Passing of Korea. p. 79.

Hideyoshi, a powerful Japanese shogun, invaded Korea, and captured Seoul, but after his death his forces were driven out by Korean soldiers with the aid of the Chinese troops.³

When the Manchus established a New Dynasty in China, the second Emperor made treaty with Korea. The oath was taken by him as follows: "from this day we have but one mind and one thought.. If Korea breaks the treaty, may Heaven send a curse upon her; if the Manchus breaks it, may they likewise be punished. The two kings have an equal regard for truth, and they will govern according to the principle of religion. May Heaven help us and give us blessing." The oath of Korea was, "This day Korea takes oath and forms a treaty with Kin Kingdom. We swear by this sacrifice that each shall dwell secure in the possession of his own lands; if either hates and injures the other, may Heaven send punishment upon the offending party. These two kings have minds regardless of truth. Each must be at peace with the other."⁴ But these oaths were worth nothing. The Japanese sent secret envoys to urge Korea against the Manchus, that she could help her (Korea) if Korea would break the oath. When it became plain that Korea was false, the Manchus invaded Korea immediately, and made the king go through a humiliating ceremony of surrender. Since this time, Korea has become a real tributary state of China continuing so until 1895.⁵

In 1875 a Japanese war vessel landed a surveying party on Kangwa Island, and was attacked by the Koreans. A cry for war in Japan was very high and a special envoy Sun Yu Lin was sent to ask the Chinese government about this case. Prince Guchin, the Chinese foreign minister, assumed "so far as Korea was the tribu-

4. Hubbert: The Passing of Korea. pp. 104.

5. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. pp. 174.

tary state of China, Japanese can not take any action upon her without negotiating with China."⁶ But unfortunately the Japanese ignored this claim, and settled the controversy directly with Korea in accordance with the well-known Kangwa Treaty. The first article of the treaty was, "Korea is an independent state and Japan treats her as equal." The fourth and the fifth articles contained, "the Japanese settlement at the Port of Fusan and provided to open two more new ports within the stated period." It was very obvious according to the first article that Japan tried to ignore the Chinese surzerainty over Korea, and pave her way of aggressive policy towards Korea. On China's side, she should protest absolutely against the treaty or even go to war with Japan unless the treaty were abolished.⁷ But on account of her ignorance of the international law, she did not say anything about this. This was the first chance for Japan to take steps in Korea, the first great mistake of China toward losing Korea, and the first thread leading to the Chinese-Japanese War.

Unfortunately, the events of 1880 caused a complete destruction of all the hopes for the progress of Korea. Some radical leaders, Kim-Hong-Jip, Kim Ok-Kyun, Pak Yang-Hyo, Su Chap-pil with some experienced Japanese, wanted to have the radical changes in government, but the Min party, the Queen's family, insisted on having a slow and moderate reform because they knew "Korea is not ready to inaugurate the sweeping changes" as the radicals imagined. The two great rival factions were responsible for the crisis in the relations between China and Japan, and were the crucial points in

6. Liu Yen: The recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 177.

7. Liu Yen: The recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 177.

the controversy of the two nations.⁸

The Military Riot of 1882 was caused by the wretched treatment of troops. The Min family was the main point of attack. Several of them were killed and the others fled. At the same time the Japanese were attacked, and the legation burned, the Min family appealed to China to put down the riot, and China sent three thousand soldiers under the command of the well-known officer, Yuan Shih-Kei, who was to play an important role in Korea. As a result peace was restored and by the payment of indemnity by Korea, the friendship with Japan was resumed. The Chinese now had firm hand on the government and exercised the real sovereign power over Korea.⁹

In 1884, the radical leaders tried to work out their radical plan of changing Korea, but their strength and influence were not enough to combat with conservatives, who had Chinese forces behind them. The leaders of that party, communicated with Japan, or at least an understanding was arrived at, that Japan should back them in their attempt to stem the current of conservatism. After arranging for a Japanese man-of-war to come to their support, the imminent danger in which this placed the radical faction caused them to act at once.¹⁰ A big banquet took place on December 4th, for celebrating the opening of the new post office. Min Yong-ik was one of the principal guests, but members of both factions were together with some foreign representatives, the Chinese generals, and the foreign advisers. In the midst of the dinner Min Yong-il was assassinated in the court. The radical leaders hurried to the palace where they secured possession of the King's person, and forced him to order all the ministers of department.

8. Hulbert: The Passing of Korea. pp. 121-122.

ments to be brought before him. When they came, they were cut down one by one in cold blood by a company of students just from Japan, who had come to the palace as bodyguard to the radical leaders, three of whom, Kim, Hong, and Pak, hastened to the palace, and persuaded the King to go elsewhere, writing at the same time to the Japanese minister, to come to the palace. The four hundred Japanese occupied the palace. They and the conspirators were installing themselves in their posts. The commander of the Chinese garrison seemed to have been, for the moment, hesitating how to act. Having been advised by some foreign representatives, he appeared to make a military attack upon the palace. The Japanese were defeated and withdrew to their legation, and the Japanese minister to leave Seoul. The entrance of the Chinese troops terminated the conspiracy, most of whom were killed, but Kim escaped to Japan. The war between the two countries seemed imminent, but was averted by negotiation between Li Hung Chang and Count Ito, who agreed upon a famous Tientsin Convention. It provided "the forces which had been sent by China to restore the order, and by Japan to re-establish her legation were to be withdrawn, the King of Korea was to be invited to organize a sufficient armed force of his own to maintain order in future. In case of any disturbance of a serious character occurring in Korea, rendering it necessary for the respective countries (China and Japan) either of them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention."¹²

9. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 185.
10. Hulbert: The Passing of Korea. p. 124.
11. Fortnightly Review. Vol. 62, pp. 618-635.
12. Curzon: Problem of the Far East. p. 193.

This was the first great reverse that Japan secured in the Chinese hands, this was the first time that Japan secured the equal footing in Corea, and this was another thread leading to the war. But really Corea henceforth was completely in China's hands and was destined to remain there until Japan reversed the verdict in 1894, just ten years later.¹³

These ten years may be passed without much comment. We still remember that Mr. Kim, one of conspirators in 1884, after living ten years as a political refugee on the Japanese soil, was persuaded by a Korean who had deliberately acquired his confidence, to run over for a trip to Shanghai, where he was promptly murdered. The murderer was arrested by the Chinese authorities and sent together with the body to Corea. The Japanese blamed the Chinese government for not punishing the murderer stringently. The irritation caused by the occurrence in Japan was so great that it has been alleged as a cause contributory to the war.

"The time was ripe, however, in other respects and it seems to be now generally admitted that Japan had been preparing a long time for a trial of strength with her imperial neighbor and that was only ^a question of occasion when the outbreak might occur. Everything tends to show that she had predetermined to strike for the preponderance in the Far East, and the various motives have been surmised as contributing to her immediate decision. Among others, the exigencies of the Japanese government itself. The overthrow of the tycoons, who represented the northern influence, is well known to have been accomplished by a combination of the southern clans.

1 3. Hulbert: The Passing of Corea. p. 126

Two of these, Satssuma and Chosin have since been able to keep the reins of government practically in their hands, though it may not be conceived without encountering jealousy and opposition. The popular demand for ministerial responsibility is said to inspire in some degree by this feeling. Dissolution after the dissolution has, at any rate, resulted in the return of a hostile majority to the Diet; and one object of this Korean enterprise is freely alleged to have been to divert population from domestic quarrels."¹⁵

A still more important motive of the Japanese Government itself in bringing on the war was in connection with its foreign policy. The original treaties contained two essential stipulations:- the one fixed a uniform customs tariff of five per cent, and the other subjected foreign residents to the jurisdiction of their own consular authorities. "The Japanese patriots began denouncing the treaties and agitating for the recovering of tariff and judicial autonomy."¹⁶ The government had two difficulties in solving the problem. The one was "European residents in estimating the situation protested to their respective governments that the change would be premature until the new codes were actually in force and their work had been tested by experience, while a strong party in Japan objected to any project of guarantees as inconsistent with the national dignity and objected even to the proposed equivalent as inconsistent with the national interests. Having gorged and being prepared to over rule the opposition at home, the Japanese statesmen, on the verge of success abroad, are said to have perceived another awkward dilemma. The new treaty is not to

15. Fortnightly Review: Vol. 62, 1894 p. 623 by Mr.R.S.Gundry.

16. " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "

come to operation until similar agreements have been reached with other powers. If China therefore restrained her present treaty and her extra-territorial rights, other nations would object to surrendering theirs or to paying higher duties than the Chinese; while if China were included in the general revision, Chinese millions might overflow across the strait and become a social embarrassment. From either point of view, China presented a difficulty. The success of war might enable Japan to dictate convenient arrangements for the future."¹⁷

The last and direct cause of the war was the insurrection of the Tang Hak,¹⁸ or the Eastern Doctrine in Corea. This party rose in revolt primarily against the Roman Catholic converts and finally against the government likewise. Thirty thousand men were soon in the army, and so successful were they that they defeated the royal troops. After capturing the important city of Chung-chong, they prepared to march to the capital, Seoul. In this serious condition, the King of Corea appealed to China for troops to help him in putting down the rebellion. In reply to the appeal, fifteen thousand soldiers were sent by China to the district on the west coast of Corea, a hundred miles from Chemulpo.¹⁹

With their arrival the insurrection collapsed. The Chinese troops returned to their country, with the exception of five hundred men who remained to act as a guard to the king in case of any further disturbance. According to the treaty of May, A. D. 1885, "the Chinese government indeed notified the Japanese government. 17. Fortnightly Review. Vol. 62 1894, p. 624.

18. Douglas: The Story of Nations. p. 433.

19. Macgowan: A History of China, p. 594.

ment on the fourth of June of its purpose, but the latter power declares that the communication was not made as promptly as it might have been, and that therefore the spirit of treaty had not been observed by China." Japan dispatched five thousand men under the command of Oshima, fifteen hundred of them marched directly to the capital of Korea, while the rest encamped at Chemulpo. "That this force meant war was evident from the fact that two hundred and fifty horses accompanied it, a considerable cannon and all the necessary equipment for a three months campaign. When the Japanese were asked the meaning of this large force, they declared that it was simply for the protection of their people, an answer that no one believed, for any danger that might have threatened them had passed away with the collapse of the rebellion."²⁰ After the Japanese troops reached Seoul, Japan asked China to cooperate with her to make certain radical reforms for the Kingdom of Korea. But China declined to join in imposing on the plea that "it was against her habits to interfere in tributary internal affairs."²¹ On the eighteenth of July of 1894, the Korean government requested the withdrawal of the Japanese troops; on the twentieth, Japan sent an ultimatum to the Korean government, to which, on the twenty-second, the Korean government gave an unsatisfactory answer. The Japanese troops attacked the King's palace and became the master of the labyrinth and consequently the government. From that time until the later flight of the King to the Russian legation, Korea was practically under the Japanese control."²² After the capture

20. Macgowan: A History of China. p. 595.

21. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 198.

22. Japan and China at War: The Nation, Vol 62, 1896. pp. 476-477.

of the King's Palace, the regular hostilities between Japan and Korea ended, and the war between China and Japan followed.

On the twenty-fifth of July, an English steamer, by the name of Kow-shing, had been chartered by Li Hung Chang to convey eleven hundred troops to Korea, and when she was nearing her destination, she was met by the Japanese man-of-war, Nanivea, and torpedoed her, only two hundred of the troops on board being eventaully saved.

The first great battle was fought at Pinyong on the fifteenth of September. The Chinese troops were defeated, six thousand men with a large quantity of arms and a great supply of provisions were lost. Two days after this, a naval battle was fought off at the mouth of the Yalu River.²³ The Chinese fleet consisted of eleven men-of-war and six torpedo boats. The battle began at ten o'clock in the morning and lasted about six hours. Although the Chinese forces showed considerable pluck in allowing themselves to be blocked about for so long a time, the Japanese, who had the faster ships and the better guns, displayed more scientific military art and good generalship than the Chinese. The result was that four Chinese ships were sunk and the others were destroyed by fire. The Japanese ships also suffered by fire, but they subsequently repaired them and were capable of joining their squadrons after a time.²⁴

The result of these two engagements gave the Japanese courage to invade Manchuria. The troops hastened from Pinyong to the Yalu, the boundary line between Korea and Manchuria. Crossing

23. Macgowan: A History of China. p. 597.

24. " " " " " p. 597.

that river without any serious obstacle, they took possession (October 25) of Chin-lien-chen. On the twenty-first of November, the Japanese troops appeared before the famous port Arthur. About two o'clock in the afternoon, with the loss of only about four hundred men, the great fortress was captured. Many innocent inhabitants were massacred by the Japanese army.²⁵

In the advance in Manchuria, Japan continued with equal success. It became plain that the Chinese government should better make peace, sending Mr. Detring to Japan on November 27th, to see if the Japanese authorities were willing to come to terms or not. As he was a foreigner of no special distinction, and with no full power to make a treaty, he was not received, and he returned to China without accomplishing anything.²⁶ On January 26th, the other two envoys, Chang Ju-Huan, and Shan Yu-lein, started for Japan to open peace negotiations, but their credentials had been found defective, and the war was still going on. Before the second envoys could be sent, the capture of Hai-chang and Kai-Pine made the Japanese forces masters of the Liao-tung peninsula. The last and the final battle at Wei-hai-wei was fought in February. On land and sea the Japanese forces were completely victorious. Admiral Ting for several days offered a most heroic defence, but after the failure to secure an important position, he committed suicide in his cabin and the flag of surrender was hoisted.²⁷

The Chinese government was clearly in danger at this time. Li Hung Chang was consequently dispatched (March 15) to Japan for peace negotiations. He was shot and badly wounded by a Japanese.

25. Macgowan: A History of China. pp. 599

26. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 218.

27. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 220.

The Japanese authorities were so distrustful. After this untoward circumstance, Japan granted an armistice for twenty days, which was subsequently to extend to May 8, excluding Formosa which the Japanese intended to conquer and occupy permanently. The negotiations were conducted by Li Hung Chang, the Plenipotentiary of China, and Ito the Plenipotentiary of Japan. The treaty including eleven articles and three separate articles was made at Shimonoseki between Japan and China, and ratifications were exchanged at Chefoo on the 8th of May. The main features and the important articles are the following:²⁸

Article I.

China recognizes definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Corea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of Ceremonies and formalities by Corea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

Article II.

China ceded to Japah in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the following territories, together with all fortifications thereon:

(a) The southern portion of the province of Feng Tien with the following boundaries:

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River Anping, from thence runs to Fen Huang, from thence to Maicheng, from thence to Ying Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in

28. See Foreign Relation of the United States, 1895, part I, pp 199-20. and The All Treaties between China and Foreign countries Chapter 9, pp 1-3

the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Teng Kow, it follows the course of that stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the demarcation.

This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fen Tien, situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao Tung and in the northeastern part of the Yellow Sea.

(b) The island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa.

(c) The pescadores Group - that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

Article IV.

China agrees to pay as war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum is to be paid in eight installments, the first installment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months and the second installment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months after the exchange of the ratifications of this act; the remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual installments, as follows:

The first of such equal annual installments to be paid within two years, the second, within three years, the third, within four years, the fourth, within five years, the fifth, within six years, the sixth, within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first installment falls due.

China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of said installments. In case the whole amount of the said indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratifications of the present act, all interest shall be waived, and the interest for two years and a half or any less period, if then already paid, shall be included as a part of the principle amount of the indemnity.

Article VI.

All treaties between China and Japan having come to an end, in consequence of war, China engages immediately upon the exchange of ratifications of this act, to appoint plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese plenipotentiaries to a treaty of commerce and navigation and a convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade.

The treaties, conventions, and regulations, now subsisting between China and European powers shall serve as basis for said treaty and convention between China and Japan. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this act until the said treaty and convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects, shall, in every respect, be accorded by China, most-favored-nation treatment.

China makes, in addition, the following concessions, to take effect six months after the date of the present act:

First. The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries, and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present in open cities, towns, and ports of China.

- (1) Shashih, in the province of Hupeh.
- (2) Chungking, in the province in Szechuan.
- (3) Suchow, in the province of Kian Su.
- (4) Hang Chow, in the province of Chekiang.

The Japanese government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above named places.

Second. Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following places.

- (1) On the upper Yangtze River, from Ichang to Chungking.
- (2) On the Woosung River and the canal, from Shanghai to Suchow and Hang Chow.

Third. Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise into the interior of China shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever.

Fourth. Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns, and the ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China shall, in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, charges, and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

In view of the first article, it puts an end to the contentions and struggles between China and Japan over Corea once and for all. China's protection over that country is at an end, and Japan now has free hand to use her best energy in forcing on the Korean government the domestic reforms. Japan at once sent one of her greatest statesmen, Count Inouye, to make this. She also sent some of the worst elements of her population, a hord of adventurous immigrants who immediately began to exploit the Korean, spoiling the name of Japanese. Let me quote Count Inouye's own words to bear witness as one of the chief reasons why Corea did not like the professedly benevolent efforts of Japan, and why Japan made the Korean conditions worse during the next ten years:

"All the Japanese are overbearing and rude in their dealings with the Koreans. The readiness of the Chinese to bow their heads may be natural instinct, but this trait in their character is their strength as merchants. The Japanese are not only overbearing but violent in their attitude toward the Koreans. When there is the slightest misunderstanding, they do not hesitate to employ their fists. Indeed, it is not uncommon for them to pitch Koreans into the river, or to cut them down with swords. If the merchants commit these acts of violence, the conduct of those who are not merchants may well be imagined. They say: We have made you an independent nation, we have saved you from the Tonghaks, whoever dares to reject our advice or oppose our actions is an ungrateful traitor. Even military coolies use language like that toward the Koreans. Under such circumstances, it would be a wonder if the Korean developed much friendship with the Japanese. It is natural that they should entertain more amicable feelings toward other nations than toward Japan. For this state of things, the

Japanese themselves are responsible. Now that the Chinese are returning to Korea, unless the Japanese correct themselves and behave with more moderation, that will entirely forfeit the respect and love of Koreans.

Another circumstance I regret very much for the sake of the Japanese residents is, that some of them have been unscrupulous enough to cheat the Korean government and people by supplying^{them} with spurious articles. The Korean taught by such experience, naturally hesitates to buy from the Japanese. An examination of recent purchases made by the Korean government from the Japanese merchants would cause conscientious men to cry out. I do not say the Japanese alone have been untrustworth. But I hope, that in the future, they will endeavor to get credit for honesty instead of aiming at immediate speculative gains."²⁹

"The Japanese had the misfortune also to be officially and inextricably implicated in an attack on the palace on the morning of October 8, in the course of which the Korean queen was brutally murdered. Japan's opportunity was for the moment, by the acts of her own subjects, worse than lost." The King fled to the Russian legation for safety, and from there for two years under Russian influence, directed the affairs of his realm.³⁰ In 1898 a Russian and Japanese agreement recognized definitely "the sovereignty and the entire independence of Corea." In Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 "the high contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea" declared themselves to be "entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in other countries."³¹

29. County Inouye, in the Nichi Nichi Shimbun, quoted by Professor Longford, in The Story of Corea, pp. 337-338.

30. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. pp.206.

31. Liu Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. p. 356.

Three years later in renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the protection of Korea integrity was forgotten, on the other hand, Great Britain recognized the right of Japan "to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard her interests provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."³² In the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia also admitted the Japanese paramount interest in Korea and the right to deem what measures were necessary. Three months after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, on the 17th of November, 1905, the Korean government was compelled to accept a convention like the following:

Preamble. (the two governments) desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two governments haveconcluded:

Article 1. The government of Japan.....will hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea.....

In 1906 Marquis Ito was appointed as the Japanese Resident-general in Korea. In 1907 the Japanese government prevented the representatives of Korea from being given a hearing at the Hague Conference. Immediately after this case, another convention³³ compelled the Korean Emperor to accept:

1. In all matters relating to the reform of Korean administration the Korean government shall receive the instructions and guidance from the Japanese Resident-General.

4. In all appointments and removals of high officials the Korean government must obtain the consent of the Resident-General.

32. Anglo-Japanese Agreement of August, 1905.

33. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 215.

5. The Korean government shall appoint to be officials of Korea, any Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General.

6. The Korean government shall not appoint any foreigners to be officials of Korea without consulting the Resident-General.

In 1908 Ito declared that the Japanese government had no intentions of annexing Korea, and in 1909 he declared that Korea must be a part of Japan. The final act was taken in 1910. The Japanese police forces were stationed in all important cities of Korea and the Korean Emperor was compelled to accept a Japanese
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annexation treaty as follows:

Article 1. His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan of all rights of the sovereignty over the whole of Korea.

Article 2. His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.

This agreement was signed on August 22, 1910, and Japan announced the annexation of Korea on August 29, 1910.

This is what Japan meant by fighting with China for the independence of Korea; this is what Japan meant by guaranteeing the integrity of that country. Doctor Francis Abbott, sometime in the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, says the following: "Finally, in July, 1894, insurrection broke out in Korea and things came to a crisis. Nothing could have suited the Japanese better. No one is so zealous as the new convert, and certainly Korea has long been in chronic need of reformation. China feared that Japan

was bent upon annexing Korea - a fear that has been completely justified by the subsequent events, although it is doubtful it were justified at that time.³⁵

As a result of the second article of the Chino-Japanese peace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France promptly compelled Japan to restore Lio-tung Peninsula ~~and~~ accept a money payment of thirty million taels instead.³⁶ As the result of the fourth article, Russia assumed the role of a devoted friend of China against the hostile Japanese, and loaned her half the money to pay the indemnity, without security. These powers, however, took such an action, not for the sake of China, but for themselves. Within two months after the treaty of Shimmonoseki, the French minister secured some territorial concessions and commercial privileges of an exclusive character along the land frontier adjoining their Indo-Chinese territories. These concessions would affect the British trade interest in South China, and so Great Britain protested against the violation of China's most favored nation pledges. China was very helpless to refuse the French demands. England therefore demanded the privileges of concession under the pretext of equal opportunity. In February 1897, China made concession to satisfy England. As to France, in the form of the cession of certain lands on the north Burmah frontier and she also made some new trade routes and ports in the south. Russia thought she greatly helped China against the Japanese aggression, so she strongly demanded some compensation. In 1896, she established the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, the Chinese Russian Bank was formed as a powerful political instrument in the hands of the Russian

35. Abbott: Japanese Expansion and American Policies. p. 43.

36. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. p. 204.

government." China did grant the rights to Russia to project the Trans-Siberian Railway across North Manchuria, and eighteen months later, to build an extension southward to Port Arthur."³⁷

Germany was one of these who compelled the Japanese to restore Liotung Peninsula to China, so she insisted on getting compensation from China. Unfortunately the murder of two German missionaries in Chantung Province in 1897 gave Germany the opportunity to seize the possession of Kiaochow Bay without any diplomatic negotiation. On March 6, 1898, the convention was signed by which Germany secured the lease of Kaio-chow Bay for ninety-nine years, and also secured some privileges for building some railways in the province and for the opening of mines along the railways, to have the first loans to China in case China borrowed money for developing that province.³⁸

After Germany occupied Kiaochow, the Russian government, in January 1898, demanded of China that Port Arthur should be leased to Russia by the way of compensation as the Kiaochow had been leased to Germany. On March 27, 1898, the Liaotung Peninsula, including an area of 1,300 square miles and Port Arthur and Talienwan was leased to Russia for a period of twenty-five years. The French government, in 1897, with the same pretext secured the declaration of China's "non-alienation" that China had no intention of ceding the Island of Hainan to any other power. Great Britain likewise secured a promise, February 11, 1898, that China had no intention of ceding Yangtse Valley to any other power. France then secured the declaration that China should not cede any part of the provinces bordering on Tonking. Japan secured the same declaration

37. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. p. 224.

38. " " " " " " " " 224.

in regard to Fukien province. In addition, France leased the Bay of Kwang-chow for the same term as the German lease in Shangtung, and Britain's lease for Wei-hai-wei was as long as Russia's. in Port Arthur.

This scramble of the foreign powers into China was due to the second article of the Chino-Japanese Peace treaty described in the foregoing paragraphs. Now I must say a few words about the effect of these actions. When the powers got the privilege to build the railways from one place to another, and even to build a short line, thousands of graves must be destroyed. This particular act did much to inflame the Chinese feeling. Again, after Germany occupied Kiao-Chau, only on the ground of killing two missionaries, the Chinese distrusted them very much. Moreover, the sudden growth of foreign influence and their trade, which threatened to disturb the economic balance of the Chinese conservatives, the ignorant people began to cry out against the foreigners. A secret society known as Boxers, "half benevolent, half mystical, and wholly patriotic" they undertook to clear their native land of the detested foreigners who profaned it.³⁹ The Boxers spread out very rapidly, and attacked the foreign legation in 1900. When the foreign troops reached China, Peking was captured, and the indemnity of 450,000,000 taels was paid to them. At first, Russia began to pour troops in from Siberia to Manchuria. When the Boxer campaign was ended and peace restored once more in China, Russia manifested a great reluctance to withdraw any troops from Manchuria.⁴⁰ This was the leading cause of the Russo-

39. Abbott: The Japanese Expansion and American Politics. p. 52.

40. " " " " " " " " p. 53.

Japanese War which I shall discuss in my next chapter.

On the conclusion of this chapter, the following statement by Doctor Hornbeck, University of Wisconsin, for sometime an instructor in the Chekiang Provincial College and in the Fengtien Law College of China, who has traveled and studied for five years in the Far East, is a very good summary of the diplomatic relations of China and Japan at the close of the war:

"We have seen elsewhere how Japan proceeded step by step between 1875 and 1895 to sever the ties which had long existed between China and Korea. It was Japan's forward policy that brought on the Chino-Japanese war of 1894. Not content with securing the termination of China's suzerainty over Korea and recognition of the complete independence of the Korean Kingdom, the Japanese exacted from China in the treaty of Shimonoseki, the cession of Formosa, the Pescadores, and the South Manchuria. It was this war and the attempt to take from China a large and important area near the political heart of the Empire--this, and not Germany's seizure of Shantung two years later--that marked the first step in the series of aggressions which culminated in the 'scramble for concessions', it was this that raised the question which soon became an issue: Is China to be partitioned? The scramble for concessions led indirectly to the Boxer uprising, the Boxer uprising gave Russia the chance to consolidate her position in Manchuria, and Russian encroachments in Manchuria led to the Russo-Japanese War. Thus did the ambition of Japan contribute to the cause of peace in the Far East!"⁴¹

41. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in The Far East. pp. 220.221.

Chapter II.

The Japanese in Manchuria.

Manchuria today is to the Far East what the Balkan States have for so long been to Europe. This fertile region, with an area equal to that of France and Germany combined is the focus of great political ambitions and designs. Immediately after the Chino-Japanese War, Russia showed herself very friendly to China, and secured large privileges and concessions in Manchuria, mentioned in the last chapter. During the outbreak of the Boxer uprising, Russia made herself at home in Manchuria. In the fall of 1900, she tried to put through an agreement with the Tartar General at Mukeden whereby a Russian Resident with general powers of control was to be installed there. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan protested against the agreement. In December, it became known that the convention would have made Manchuria a Russian protectorate. The three great powers renewed their protest against the continued occupation by the Russian forces. In 1902, on account of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia modified her position, and made an agreement with China, promising gradually to withdraw her forces from Manchuria, and restore to China the Shanhaikuan-Newchuang-Hsinmintun Railway which she occupied during the Boxer uprising. In October, 1903 the Russian evacuation still did not take place. It was closely estimated that Russia had 45,000 soldiers in Manchuria. In August, 1903, in consultation with the Russian Minister at Tokyo, the Japanese minister, Baron Komura, drafted the proposal as the following:¹

1. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 247.

1. The Independence and integrity of China and Corea should be respected and the open door should be preserved.

2. Japan's interests in Corea and Russia's in Manchuria should be recognized.

3. Each power should be at liberty as to industrial and commercial activities in its sphere of influence, without interference from the other.

4. Only sufficient troops should be kept on the ground to protect interests, and these should be recalled when no longer needed.

5. Russia should recognize exclusive interests of Japan in assisting the Korean government.

Russia presented the counter proposals and claimed that Japan should recognize Manchuria as the outside of her sphere of influence, but Russia did not mention recognizing Manchuria as outside of her sphere of interests if Russia would reciprocate by recognition of Corea as outside of the Russia sphere. Russia ignored the proposals about Corea and declined to discuss the Manchurian questions. Japan again sent a third communication, but Russia still insisted upon being left absolutely in Manchuria. Finally Japan sent an ultimatum, and war began.

At the beginning of war, both belligerents made an agreement that the neutrality of China should be respected, except in Manchuria, which subsequently became the battle field. As the result of the war, the Russians were driven out of South Manchuria.

When the Japanese occupied this territory, they treated the Chinese more severely and unjustifiably than the Russians had done. They put many Chinese to death, those whom they suspected of

being in favor of the Russians. They requisitioned and confiscated the Chinese properties on the ground of military necessity, but they really used them for the other purposes. The Japanese military authority issued warrants to seize the goods and imprison or put to death the possessors.² The Japanese administration declared the Russian currency, roubles, illegal in South Manchuria but at the same time the Japanese agents bought the Roubles from the Chinese with Japanese war notes. They sent these through the Yokohama Specie Bank to Tientsin, where they could get full face value. It was estimated "millions of dollars were squeezed out of the Chinese population by this process."³ Moreover, when the war was going on, thousands of Chinese abandoned their homes and properties upon the advance of the Japanese armies. Many of the noncombatant Japanese of the low character lost no time in establishing themselves on these abandoned homes. As time passed and partial order was restored in the regions, the Chinese refugees began to return and found their homes being occupied. No Chinese in these coast regions were permitted to open, and so the Chinese owners could not get justice to restore their properties.

When the war closed no Japanese soldier set foot on the Russian soil. Russia still had great influence politically and economically in North Manchuria. The Russian generals were begging the Tzar to continue the conflict, because they knew the Japanese had been exhausted after their brilliant series of victories. On account of internal questions in Russia, the Tzar was willing to make peace with Japan. In the spring of 1905

2. T. F. Millard: The New Far East. pp. 148-150.

3. " " " " " " " " 150-153.

the Japanese government requested Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, the President of the United States, as the mediator, to make peace with Russia. The peace conference was held at Portsmouth. The Russian plenipotentiary, Count White, and the Japanese plenipotentiary, Baron Kormura, concluded the Portsmouth Treaty of fifteen articles. The important ones concerning China are the following:⁴

Article III. To completely and simultaneously evacuate Manchuria, with the exception of the territory over which the lease of the peninsula of Liaotung extends, in accordance with the provision of additional article 1. annexed to this treaty, and

(2) To entirely and completely restore to the exhaustive administration of China all parts of Manchuria now occupied by the Russians and the Japanese, or which are under their control, with the exception of the above mentioned territory.

Article IV. Russia and Japan mutually pledge themselves not to place any obstacle in the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and which might for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria.

Article V. The Imperial government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, of Talien, and of the adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as the rights, privileges, and concessions connected with this lease or forming part thereof, and it is likewise ceded to the Imperial Government of Japan, all the public works and property within the territory over which the abovementioned lease extends.

Article VI. The Imperial Government of Russia obligates herself to yield to the Imperial Government of Japan, without

compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the Chan-Chun (Kwan-Chien-Tsi) and Port Arthur Railway and all its branches, with all the rights, privileges and property thereunto belonging within this region, as well as the coal mines in said region belonging to this railroad or being operated for its benefit. The two high contracting parties mutually pledge themselves to obtain from the Chinese Government the consent mentioned in the foregoing clause.

Article VII. Russia and Japan agree to operate their respective railroads in Manchuria for commercial and industrial purposes exclusively, but by no means for strategic purposes.

It is agreed that this restriction does not apply to the railroads within the territory covered by the lease of the Liaotung peninsula.

In addition to article III, the Imperial Governments of Russia and Japan mutually agree to begin the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace goes into force, and within the period of eight months from the date, the armies of the two powers should be entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, with the exception of the leased territory of the Peninsula of Liao-tung. The forces of the two powers occupying advanced positions are to be withdrawn first.

The high contracting parties reserve the right to maintain guards for the protection of their respective railroad lines in Manchuria. The number of these guards shall not exceed 15 men per kilometer.

After the ratification of the Portsmouth Treaty between Russia and Japan, relating to Manchuria, China and Japan

opened negotiations for the purpose of solving the complex relations between the two countries and this treaty was signed in 1905, and subsequently ratified.

Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government consents to all transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Article V. and VI. of the treaty of peace.

Article II. The Imperial Japanese Government engage that in regard to the leased territory as well as in the matter of railway construction and exploitation, it will, so as circumstances permit, conform the original agreements concluded between China and Russia. In case any question arises in the future on these subjects, the Japanese Government will decide it in consultation with the Chinese Government.

Supplementary Agreement.

Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees as soon as possible after the evacuation of Manchuria by the Russian and Japanese forces, the following cities and towns in Manchuria will be opened by China herself as the places of international residence and trade:- Shingking Province - Fengwangcheng, Liao-yung, Hsinmintun, Tieling, Tungkiantzu and Fakumen; Kirini Province - Chengchun, Kirin, Harbin, Ninguta, Hunchun and Sengsing, Heilungkiang Province - Tsitsihar, Hailar, Aihun and Manchuli.

Article IV. The Imperial Government of Japan engages that Chinese public and private property in Manchuria, which they have occupied or expropriated on account of military necessity, shall be restored at the time the Japanese troops are withdrawn from Manchuria, and that property as is no longer required for military purposes shall be restored even before such withdrawal.

Article VI. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees that Japan has the right to maintain and work the military railway line constructed between Antung and Moukden, and to improve said line so as to make fit for the conveyance of commercial and industrial goods of all nations. The term for which such right is conceded is for fifteen years from the date of the completion of the improvement above provided for, the work of such improvements to be completed within two years, exclusive of a period of twenty months during which work will have to be delayed owing to the necessity of using the existing road for the withdrawal of troops. The term of this concession is therefore to expire in the 49th year of Kuang Hsu (1923). At the expiration of that term, the said railway shall be sold to China at a price to be determined by appraisement of all its properties by a foreign expert to be selected by both parties.

Article X. The Imperial Chinese Government agrees that a joint-stock company of forestry, composed of Japanese and Chinese capitalists, shall be organized for the exploitation of the forests in the regions on the right bank of the Yalu River, and that a detailed agreement shall be concluded in which the area and term of the concession, as well as the organization of the company and all regulations concerning the joint work of exploitation, shall be provided for. The Japanese and Chinese stock holders shall share equally in the profits of the undertaking.

In the foregoing treaties, we have made clear what the Japanese legal rights over South Manchuria are, those which Russia has given up, and to what China has consented. Now we are going to examine what Japan has done in Manchuria since the

Russo-Japanese War.

Did Japan observe Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty in which Japan and Russia mutually pledged themselves not to place any obstacle in the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and that which China might adopt for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria? In December of 1905, Japan compelled the Chinese Government to make a reluctant secret protocol in which China undertook upon Japan's demand, "not to construct any railway lines parallel to and competing with the South Manchuria Railway."⁵ The Chinese Government refused to agree to this protocol although Japan claimed the contrary.

In 1909, Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State of the United States, resolved to submit to the consideration of the powers, his plan for the neutralization of the railways, both those existing and those to be built in Manchuria. Mr. Knox's plan contemplated making Manchuria a neutral area, as far, at least, as railways were concerned, where all powers should have and be guaranteed as nearly as possible equal opportunities. What he actually proposed was that the powers together loan China sufficient money to buy interests from Japan and Russia, and to construct more railway lines in Manchuria, all these lines to be properties of China, but their administration to be, for the time being, at least, under some sort of an international commission. The German government and the British Government gave tentative approval, but the Russian and Japanese Governments were absolutely against the plan.

What is the meaning and principle of the "open door policy" and "equal opportunity"? Do these phrases not apply to the

5. Millard: American and Far Eastern Question. p. 548.

to the idea of commercial neutralization? It is clear that Japan violated Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty. "To recapitulate" says Mr. F. Thomas Millard, in his American and the Far Eastern Question, "we find that the following issues affecting the sovereignty of China and the Open Door principle within her territory were sharply defined by the results of Mr. Knox's efforts. First, the right of China to decide upon the course of railway development within her territory was denied by foreign nations. Secondly, certain foreign nations declared that the strategical and political interests must be considered as paramount in planning a railway system within China's territory. Thirdly, foreign nations have asserted the right to interfere in business transactions between American citizens and the Chinese Government, in violation of treaties of the United States and China, and of covenants of those Governments with China and the United States, a doctrine which is susceptible to worldwide application."⁶ It is clear that Mr. Knox's diplomacy did not cause such results, but it only exposed them and brought them out into the open.

Did Japan observe the Article IV of the additional agreement between China and Japan, that Japan would restore the Chinese public and private properties after the war? Many Chinese moved to the interior of China from Manchuria during the war. When they came back, after the war was over, they found their properties were occupied by the Japanese. They tried to get them back from the Japanese but they always failed. They then protested to the Japanese authorities, but it was very hard to get any justice from them. "When I was in Mukdon, I could give many instances like these," said Mr. Millard, "many Chinese owners have lost their properties altogether,

6. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question. pp. 25-26.

and sometimes lost their lives trying to recover them."⁷

Did the Japanese respect the Chinese laws and regulations in Manchuria? The Japanese immigrants refused to pay the likin or internal taxes. The Chinese officers dared not to collect taxes from them, and the police dared not to interfere with them in such cases, for it would speedily bring a detachment of the Japanese troops to the place and might lead to the humiliation of the Chinese officers. "When I was last in Manchuria," Mr. Millard said, "a Japanese merchant in a non-treaty town attempted to secure the agency at that place for a foreign firm by claiming that he could represent it to better advantage than its Chinese agent, because he (the Japanese) does not have to pay Likin."⁸

Did Japan observe Article IV of the supplementary agreement between China and Japan in 1905, that the changing of the Antung and Moukden military railway into an industrial and commercial railway should be completed within two years, exclusive of a period of twelve months during which proceedings^{would} have to be delayed owing to the necessity of using the existing railway for the withdrawal of troops? According to this article, Japan should have begun to improve the railway about the end of the year 1906, and should have completed it about the end of the year 1908. Until the end of 1908 the Japanese government neither changed it nor had tried to do so. This article was naturally nullified on account of Japan's failure to change the railway during the required period. But Japan disregarded this fact, and in January 1909 suddenly demanded of China that Japan have the right to construct a new line from Antung to

7. Thomas F. Millard: America and the Far Eastern Question. p. 221

8. " " " " " " " " " p. 257.

Moukden instead of changing the old military line. The Chinese Government refused to accept this demand. Japan sent an ultimatum to China that she would take free action if China still refused Japan's demand. At the same time, Japan ordered her navy and military forces to mobilize near China. Under such serious conditions China had only two alternatives - accept the demand or fight for her existence. Of course China knew her own weakness, and so she reluctantly yielded to Japan.⁹ During the same year, Japan compelled the Chinese Government to permit the Korean people to live in the Tumen River Valley, although they must be under the Chinese court of jurisdiction. Moreover, she furnished China half the capital for the completion of the Hsinmintun-Mukden line and for the Kirin-Changchun line, securing the pledge in connection with the latter that, if it were to be extended, application for the assistance should be made to the South Manchuria Railway Company. Besides all of these, the Japanese also secured complete control of the Fushun Mines, the greatest coal mines in all the Far East.¹⁰ Furthermore, the Japanese compelled the Chinese owners along the Yalu River to sell their timbers to the Japanese Company. Some of them were killed when they refused to sell at the lowest price.

With these developments, the Japanese Government, from its base in the leased territory and through the consulates and railway company, went on effectively consolidating and extending its influence. The result was that the Japanese authorities became absolute not only in the leased territory and the Railway Zones, but throughout the whole territory of Southern Manchuria. In 1915, Japan went further. She secured the right for Japanese people to acquire

9. Lui Yen: The Recent Diplomatic History of China. pp. 465-470.

10. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 262.

lands in Manchuria, and prolong the terms of the leased territory and the Antung-Mukden Railway, to be discussed in the Fourth Chapter of the Japanese' twenty-four Demands.

Have the Japanese discriminated and ruined the commerce of the other countries in South Manchuria? The Japanese goods were allowed to pass northward from the leased territory without paying the custom duties, and the tariff of the South Manchuria Railway did and does discriminate against the port of New Chwang in favor of Dariein. The Yokohama Specie Bank, on account of government participation, loaned at the lowest rate of the Japanese in order to compete with the foreign trade. More serious than this, the Japanese refused to pay the taxes on the Japanese products of Tobacco while the American-British Company had to pay taxes on their products. Moreover, the Japanese tried to immitate the trade mark and pictures and the words of the American-British Company's cigarette packages, and tried to sell them to the Chinese consumers. When the Chinese consumers found out that the quality was very poor, they thought the American-British cigarettes were to blame, not knowing that they were Japanese imitations. This was the great evidence that the Japanese intended to ruin the reputation of the American-British Tobacco Company.¹¹

What is the Japanese administration in the leased territory? The Japanese administration in the Leased territory included an area of 1,303 square miles, and Railway Zones of 70.54 miles. Within the territory, the important cities are Darein and Port Arthur and the railways are divided into fifty-five stations, at most of which the Japanese have settlements. There were in the leased territory at the end of 1912, some 456,000 Chinese and 45,000

11. Millard: America and the Far Eastern Question. pp. 234-236.

Japanese. In the railway settlements, some 28,000 Chinese and 25,500 Japanese. The leased territory and Railway Zone are subjected to the control of Ministry of foreign affairs at Tokyo and are in the hands of a Governor-General with official headquarters at Port Arthur. The railway is controlled by the Ministry of Communication in Tokyo. The Governor-General must be an officer of the Imperial army. He not only has the power of civil affairs and control of railway guards, but also the diplomatic power of negotiating with the Chinese authorities.

On the conclusion of this Chapter to summarize what the Japanese have done in Manchuria:

They confiscated the Chinese properties on the ground of military necessity; they punished many innocent Chinese by death on the suspicion of favoring the Russians; they failed to restore the Chinese public and private properties after the war; they denied the Manchurian railway neutralization; they refused to pay internal taxes; they compelled the Chinese Government to accept their demands of building the Antung-Mukden Railway, and opening the Fushun Mines; they discriminated and ruined the commerce of the other countries; they vetoed the important issues of Chinese authorities. All of these have violated the Open Door Policy, and the Chinese integrity.

Chapter III.

The Japanese in Shangtung.

Shangtung is one of the Chinese eastern provinces. It is situated in the mouth of the Yellow River, to the west of the Yellow Sea, on the shore opposite to the Liotungtung peninsula, and the Kingdom of Corea. It has eight hundred miles of coast line. The strategical points of this province are Weihaiwei which was leased to Britain in 1898 for twenty-five years, and Kai-chow Bay which was leased to Germany in the same year for ninety-nine years.

In a few days after the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, August 4, 1914, there were developments which indicated that China might be involved by the participation of Japan as a belligerent. China immediately approached the United States and Japan with a request that these governments use their good offices to obtain the consent of all belligerents to preserve the neutrality of all Chinese territory leased to the foreign nations. This plan would have included all the leased territories, such as the leased territory of Kiachow (Germany), the leased territory of Port Arthur and Dalny, the regions occupied by Russia under the Manchurian railway agreements. It was obvious "by this device all the territories occupied by the belligerents and possible belligerents in China could have been neutralized, any troops and war materials which could not be removed, or interned, and their warlike use prevented. It was evident that possession was not essential strategically to the military and navy operation, and could have been neutralized without working disadvantage to either belligerent side." "The interests of every foreign nation, except Japan," says Millard, and "the interests of humanity also, would be served by such an agree-

ment, but Japan hastened to block it by interposing the wall of irrevocable events."

On August 15, Japan as an ally of Great Britain in the agreements of 1902, 1905, and 1911, each to undertake to protect the interests of the other if those interests were threatened by a third power, delivered an ultimatum to Germany consisting of two important propositions:¹

First, to withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which can not be withdrawn, and second, to deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. The Imperial Japanese Government announced at the same time that in the event of not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, the answer of the German Imperial Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above demand offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they would be compelled to take such action as they might deem necessary to meet the situation.²

Germany made no reply to Japan. On August 23rd, the Emperor of Japan, in declaring war on Germany, said:

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities on

1. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question. pp. 88-90.

2. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 287.

that country and Germany is at Kiaochow, its leased territory in China, busy with like preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

"Accordingly, our government, and that of his Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance, and we, on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.

"It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war."³

The real purpose of Japan will not be difficult to be discovered. That her part in the European war was not for the peace of the Far East as declared by her diplomats at the outset, but a move in her ambition to dominate China.⁴ The desire to possess Kiachow because of its proximity to the island empire supplied the strongest incentive to Japan to acquire it by any means whenever an opportunity presented itself. With the possession of South Manchuria the Liaotung peninsula, Korea, and Kiaochow, Japan will have strong bases for commercial and territorial expansion into regions beyond.

To disguise the real facts and to secure a favorable opinion from the world, the Japanese Government began a systematic effort to explain its actions and to relieve the uneasiness that

3. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. pp. 287-288.

4. Jones: The Fall of Tsingai. p. 4.

such action would cause in Western nations. On the day Japan's ultimatum to Germany was delivered, Count Okuma, the Premier of Japan, sent the following telegram to the press of the United States through the East and West Bureau (New York), the Japanese semi-official news in America:⁵

"Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd rumors, but I declare that Japan acts with a clear conscience, in conformity with justice, and in perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no territorial ambition, and hopes to stand as the protector of peace in the Orient."

On August 20th, Baron Kato, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, communicated to the Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, the following statement:

"The history of the seizure of the place (Kiaochow) by Germany and her conduct preceding her intervention in conjunction with Russia and France, after the Chino-Japanese War, show that it is absolutely necessary to eliminate such possession completely if Japan is to restore immediately complete peace in the Far East in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. If Japan is to look far enough into the future and adopt measures to insure an abiding peace in Eastern Asia, she must realize in the hands of a hostile military power right in the heart of the country cannot in itself fail to be a menacing factor."

On August 24th, Count Okuma cabled to the New York Independent a "Message to the American people:"

"Every sense of loyalty and honour obliges Japan to

5. Thomas F. Millard: Our Eastern Question. p. 98.

to cooperate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who in the past, the present, and the future menace her interests, her trade, her shipping, and people's lives..... As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought to deprive China or other peoples of anything which they possess.

My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps her promises."

In view of such commendable and admirable motives and assurances in the ultimatum to Germany and in the speeches and messages of Count Okuma, China should have no cause to fear for the entrance of Japan into the war. The settlement in the Far East seemed to assure China and the powers of immediate peace soon after the reduction of the German lease hold. But China was nevertheless afraid of witnessing a war in her territory.

In the military operation against Kiaochow, the Japanese landed their troops at a port on the northern coast of Shangtung nearly one hundred miles away and used the intervening Chinese soil as a base of operation. The Chinese Government protested against the violation of its sovereign rights but made no resistance, and then, following the precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War, voluntarily declared the war zone about Kiaochow.⁶ According to all neutral opinion, this zone was big enough for any operation which Japan might carry on against the German stronghold. It looked as if

6. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 290.

China made a wise decision.⁷

On September 2nd, Japanese transports arrived and Lungkow and troops advanced westward, and on September 20th they occupied Weih sien, which was outside the war zone and then went to Tsinanfu, the capital of Shantung, which is 256 miles from Kiaochow. After they occupied many other points west, they seized the entire Kiaochow Tsinan Railway, the property of private Chinese and German individuals. Then all the mines along the railway were also seized together with real property which was suspected of belonging to Germany.⁸

This was the way Japan treated China during the days previous to actual operation against Kiaochow. A witness writes: "In all these operations Japan exhibited none of that spirit of friendliness toward China, the existence of which was suggested by the promise to restore Kiaochow, and proclaimed by Premier Count Okuma and other responsible spokesmen of Japan. She in no case showed any appreciation of the painful position in which China was placed, but on the contrary her actions were brusque and provocative." Then in view of this situation, we can only conclude that Japan was bent upon much bigger things than merely the defense of the interests of her ally and the peace of the Far East.

Another description of Japan's military operation against Kiaochow is presented by Professor Jenks, thus: "Before Tsingtau was taken, she (Japan) scattered her troops over Shangtung, in a manner which 'military necessity' could not pretend to explain, this and her truculent attitude toward Chinese officials begot and compelled Chinese resentment. Some of the details of Japanese campaigns

7. T. F. Millard: Our Eastern Question. p. 107

8. Millard: Our Eastern Question. pp. 108-109.

9. Crow: Japan and America. p. 263.

in Shangtung, confirmed to me personally in a way which establishes their truth beyond question, cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance. There are some things so unspeakable that attempt to excuse them merely makes bad worse. The conduct of responsible Japanese officers toward the Chinese women of Shangtung marks an ugly page in the annals of Japanese warfare, which a friendly world had placed upon a very high plane, indeed. The Kokusai (Japan's official news service) has seen to it that due credit has been given to Japan's treatment of German prisoners and enemy traders. Not a word has been published about the hundred of Chinese women and girls forced by Japanese officials to become the victims of Japanese lust. The story of how, upon their knees, in agony and in shame, with blood extracted from the tips of their fingers, they wrote their pathetic appeal to the Chinese Government, how the Chinese commissioners were received with contemptuous amusement, has yet to be written. I should not care to write the fact that the women were eventually released does not excuse the shameful deed. This is one of Japan's acts in China for which she cannot hope to make amend."¹⁰

Furthermore, Professor Jenks proceeded with his discussion. "Japan had a great opportunity to secure China, herself, and Humanity, when quite legitimately, she attacked the German stronghold of Tsingtan. Instead of arriving to this opportunity, because of her spirit of opportunities, she rode roughshod from one blunder to another. First, she ignored China's declaration of neutrality, paid absolutely no attention to the war zone, arranged according to Russo-Japanese precedent. She landed her troops at Lungkow, forcibly

10. Jenks: Japan's Act in China. in World's Work. Jan. 1917.

trampling China's protest. She pleaded military necessity, Germany's excuse for violating the neutrality of Belgium."¹¹

Mr. J. Jones, another eye-witness to the Japanese war operation, writes the following statement in his "Fall of Tsingtau:"

"By this unnecessary action Japan had violated the neutrality of China, and though England had joined in the European War because Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium, the British Government for some reason unknow, did not think it necessary when all the eyes of the world were upon Europe, to protest loudly, to her ally in China, against the very thing that had seemingly so shocked her in Belgium."

But Japan's ambition did not stop her. After the capture of Kiaochow, she showed absolutely no sign of retiring from Shangtung Province. On the contrary, she proceeded systematically to establish her authority in the places already occupied and to extend it over Shangtung Province. Garrisons were stationed along the Tsinan-Tsingtau Railway, and at Tsinan-fu, the capital of the Province; at Lungkow, Wei-shien, and other important ports. By a gradual and at times subtle process, Chinese police communication and other local administrative functions were negatived and usurped, after the system which had been employed and perfected in Corea and Manchuria. An influx of a low class of Japanese immigration followed on the heels of the Japanese military. A year after the occupation, an official report showed 16,000 Japanese in the city of Tsingtun.¹²

Besides these, she went further and confiscated some Chinese property as well as the German private property; she appointed the Japanese as the officers of the Chinese Custom House

11. Jenks: Japan's Act in China. in World's Work. Jan.1917. p.322.

at Tsingtau; she forced the Chinese Government to grant more privileges beyond what she inherited from Germany by the unreasonable demands in 1915. All of these facts indicated that Japan had no intention of restoring Kiaochow to China. Most European powers consider that Germany is the menace to the peace of Europe. China can not but come to the conclusion that Japan occupies the same position in respect to the Far East.

12. Millard: Our Eastern Question p. 114-115.

Chapter IV.

Japan's Demands.

In the history of all nations, seldom can be found a document from one sovereign state to another such as the demands Japan presented to China on January 18, 1915. Guiltless of offense was China but Japan, with no shadow of excuse, presented to her a document which has all but robbed the Celestial Kingdom of sovereignty. In the presentation of these demands, the Chinese government knew clearly that Japan was trying to dominate China; but on the other hand, the Japanese Government pretended "to adjust matters to meet the new situation created by the war between Japan and Germany, to bring closer the friendly relations existing between Japan and China, and thus to insure the permanent peace of the Far East."¹ I intend now to show what the Japanese ambitions really were.

The following, which is an officially verified translation of the note handed to the President of China by the Japanese Minister on the date mentioned, will show clearly the extent of the dream of dominating China:

I.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations agree to the following articles:

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may

1. Japan's Official Communique. p. 1.

hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions, which Germany by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

II.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agrees to the following articles:

Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside

and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall be first consulted.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Chang Chun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement.

III.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the

following articles:-

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out by any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

IV.

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agrees to the following special article:-

The Chinese engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

V.

Article 1. The Chinese Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article 3. Insomuch as the Japanese Government and the

Chinese Government have many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases which cause no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in China Chino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese materials to be purchased.

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hung-chow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour-works (including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

The manner of presenting these demands was very unusual. Instead of presenting them to the Chinese foreign office, the Japanese Minister, Mr. Hioki, formally requested an interview with the President of the Chinese Republic. By such an action it is obvious that Japan has violated the diplomatic usage of modern civilized countries. Before the Japanese Minister interviewed Yuan Shih Kai, the Chinese President, most people thought it the purpose

of Mr. Hioki to discuss some matters relating to Shantung or perhaps he wished to carry personally to the President the pleasant assurances of Japan's consideration and friendship, which Count Okuma previously had conveyed through mutual friends, or perhaps Mr. Hioki's call was simply formal.² On the morning of January 18, the Japanese legation sent the President a direct copy of the demands, which had to be hurriedly translated. On the evening of the same day, Mr. Hioki called on Yuan Shi Kai. After the usual formalities, the Japanese minister began the presentation of the demands by some remarks. Then he proceeded to read the demands. Yuan Shi Kai sat with an expressionless face and did not interrupt. After Mr. Hioki made some extended remarks to the effect that, in order to prevent complications, neither the Chinese Government nor the Japanese should give out the information which had been given to China until the questions were settled. Mr. Hioki further said that if China failed to meet the Japanese advice in a satisfactory manner or delayed in adjusting the questions, it might not be possible for Japan to continue to restrain the activities of the Chinese revolutionists then sojourning in Japan. With the usual polite remarks, the interview was ended.³

As shown by the scope and character of the demands, Japan was trying to bring about the establishment of a suzerainty over China. Therefore she compelled China not to communicate her situation to other Powers and not to give publicity to these demands. In short, Japan put the sword at China's throat, and intended to impose star-chamber proceedings until China's assent was procured. "To accomplish this Japan used widespread control and influence over the

2. Millard: Our Eastern Question. p. 130.

3. " " " " p. 131.

international publicity relating to Far Eastern affairs, to prevent the news about her demands from getting out, and after it began to leak, to obscure the truth by denials and evasions." Count Okuma, for instance, on April 3, had declared, 'Japan has not demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers,' also that 'in Shantung Japan is only asking for what China has already granted to Germany.'"⁴

Furthermore, the Japanese editors insisted that China was misrepresenting the substances of the demands.⁵ Until the legations of the Powers in Peking had comprehended the immense importance of matters, and had communicated the full text of Japan's demands to their governments, until the foreign officers made inquiries of the Japanese ambassadors there and made inquiries of the Tokyo Government, the Japanese Government gave no information. After the inquiries of the Powers had been made, the Japanese Government furnished them a memorandum of eleven articles as follows:

I.

In relating to the Shantung Province.

Article 1. Engagement on the part of China to consent to all matters that may be agreed upon between Japan and Germany with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which in virtue of treaties or otherwise Germany possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. Engagement not to alienate or lease upon any pretext the Province of Shantung or any portion thereof and any island lying near the coast of the said province.

Article 3. Grant to Japan the right of construction of a

4. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. p. 329.

5. " " " " " " " " p. 305

railway connecting Chifu or Lungkow and the Tsinan-Kiaochou Railway.

Article 4. Addition of open marts in the Province of Shantung.

II.

In relation to south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia.

Article 1. Extension of the terms of the lease of Kwangtung, the South Manchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway.

Article 2. (a) Acquisition by the Japanese of the right of resident and ownership of land. (b) Grant to Japan of the mining rights of mines specified by Japan.

Article 3. Obligation on the part of China to obtain in advance the consent of Japan if she grants railway concessions to any third Power, or procures the supply of capital from any Power for railway construction or loan from any other Power on the security of any duties or taxes.

Article 4. Obligation on the part of China to consult Japan before employing advisers or tutors regarding political, financial or military matters.

Article 5. Transfer of the management and control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Japan.

III.

Agreement in principle that, at an opportune moment in the future, the Hanyehping Company should be placed under Japanese and Chinese cooperation.

IV.

Engagement in accordance with the principle of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China, not to alienate or

lease any ports any bayson, or any island near, the coast of China.

By means of the above eleven articles from which she omitted the most objectionable demands, Japan attempted to deceive the governments of the Powers, but, concerning the original 21 drastic demands, continued to press the negotiations, threatening China with force.

The original demands, were divided into five groups, each referring to a particular subject. The first four were introduced by cleverly constructed preambles, but the fifth has no introduction and explanation. The characteristics of these five groups are of three types: in some cases Japan asked for options; in others, to exercise the veto powers over the actions of the Chinese Government; in the third, to have for herself a position of definite, immediate, direct, and important special privilege.

Group I related to the Province of Shantung. Japan demanded not only that all German holdings should be turned over to Japan, but also demanded privileges which Germany never had. These were as follows: That China should not lease to other countries any territory on the coasts of Shantung; that she should grant to Japan the right to construct a new railway in Shantung, and a line from Tungchow near Chefoo to Weih sien. This latter demand arose because of the stand taken by China on two previous occasions. In the first of these the Chinese decided to construct the line in question for and by themselves. In the second place, it became China's railway policy no longer to give concessions to foreign powers or to have railways built by foreigners and with foreign capital. China and the world had learned from the experience of Manchuria that railways in Russian and Japanese hands had been not alone the instruments of economic advantage but used also for the furtherance of their own

aims.⁶

Group II related to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The articles are in complete contravention of the "Open Door" principle and are in violation of Japanese treaties with the other powers, and subordinate Chinese administration in those regions to Japan's authorities. If China wanted advice upon affairs in these regions, Japan must be selected; if China wanted to borrow foreign capital to build railways, to get loans on the security of local taxes, Japan's consent must be obtained. The Japanese people were to be allowed to enjoy free travel, engage in business, and in manufacture of any sort, lease or own land and erect buildings, and open mines through the regions. These last mentioned provisions would have three immediate effects: In the first place, they would arouse feelings of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese subjects; in the second place, they would increase the difficulty of China's protection of foreigners in China; third and the most important, the Chinese people are comparatively poor, and on the other hand, the foreigners are rich. If the foreigners are allowed to purchase freely cheap land in China, the Chinese people will suffer a great disadvantage.⁷ In addition to the above effects, the other great fact is that where Japanese traders go, there Japanese officials will go, where officials go, soldiers will go; at every turn the authority of China will be diminished and that of Japan increased. "In the guise of peaceful commerce and colonization, the process is really one of military and political invasion, preparing the way for absorption without battle.

Group III. related to the great Hayehping Company whose iron and steel mills are located at Hankow, where the coal and iron

6. Hornbeck: Contemporary Politics in the Far East. pp. 312-313.

7. T. F. Millard: Our Eastern Question. p. 151.

are near at hand, and where the heart of the British share of influence is found. Now the Japanese asked not only for a partnership in the Company but also the control of the Company, not only to prevent foreigners and Chinese from opening any mines in all the region round about, but also to prevent any enterprise which would, in the opinion of the Japanese, be held likely directly or indirectly to affect the interests of the Company.

Group IV. related to the entire coast line of China. These demands were on the one hand negative and on the other hand positive in their forms. The one prohibits China from disposing of her territory to any third power; the latter allows China to dispose of her territory to Japan only.

Group V. was most drastic and unreasonable. It would reduce China to a place of a vassal of Japan, by making her relations almost identical with those between Great Britain and Egypt before the present war, and with the relation of Japan to Korea before the annexation. China must employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, military affairs; China must admit Japanese to participate in the policing of the important places; China must purchase at least fifty per cent of her ammunition from Japan and allow Japan to establish an arsenal in China; China must grant Japan the privilege of building important railway lines in Yangtse Valley; China must allow the Japanese to carry on missionary propaganda and own lands for hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior: China must give first option for furnishing capital for development (including dock yards) in Fukien Province to Japan. The most astonishing and serious demands were those concerning the police power and purchase of arms. If China granted the first one, her sovereignty would be abrogated and she would be unable to administer her own affairs.

If she granted the second one, she would be at the mercy of Japan. If she granted these along with other demands, she would be assigned to a position as a protectorate of Japan.

This Chinese official statement showed clearly her opinion regarding the demands:

"Of the twenty-one original demands there were six, as previously mentioned, to which China could not agree on the ground that they were not proper subjects for international negotiation, conflicting as they did with the sovereign rights of China, the treaty rights of other Powers, and the principle of equal opportunity.

"Thus, for example, the second article of the Hanyehping question in the original Third Group in particular, seriously affected the principle of equal commercial and industrial opportunity.

"The proposal that there should be joint administration by China and Japan of the police in China was clearly an interference with the Republic's domestic affairs, and consequently an infringement of her sovereignty. For that reason the Chinese Government could not take the demand into consideration. But when it was explained by the Japanese Minister that this referred only to South Manchuria, and he suggested that his Government would be satisfied if China agreed to engage Japanese as police advisers for that territory, the Chinese government accepted the suggestion.

"The two articles relating to the acquisition of land for schools, hospitals, and temples, as well as to the right of missionary propaganda, would, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, have presented grave obstacles to the consolidation of the friendly feeling subsisting between the two people. The religions of the two countries are identical and therefore the need for a missionary propaganda to be carried on in China by Japanese does not exist. The

natural rivalry between Chinese and Japanese followers of the same faith would tend to create incessant disputes and friction. Whereas western missionaries live apart from the Chinese communities among which they labour, Japanese monks would live with the Chinese, and the similarity of their physical characteristics, their religious garb, and their habits of life would render it impossible to distinguish them for the purposes of affording the protection which the Japanese Government would require should be extended to them under the system of extraterritoriality now obtaining in China. Moreover, a general apprehension exists among the Chinese people that these peculiar conditions favouring conspiracies for political purposes might be taken advantage of by some unscrupulous Chinese.

"The demand for railway concessions in the Yangtze Valley conflicted with the Ahanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreement of March 6, 1908, the Nanking-Changsha Railway Agreement of March 31, 1914, and the engagement of August 24, 1914, giving preference to British firms for the projected line from Nanchang to Chaochowfu. For this reason the Chinese Government found themselves unable to consider the demand, though the Japanese Minister, while informed of China's engagements with Great Britain, repeatedly pressed for its acceptance.

"In respect to the demand for the appointment of influential Japanese to be advisers in political, financial and military affairs, the policy of the Chinese Government in regard to the appointment of advisers has been similar to that which has presumably guided the Japanese Government in like circumstances, namely the selection of the best qualified men irrespective of their nationality. As an indication of their desire to avail themselves of the services of eminent Japanese, one of the earliest appointments made to an

advisership was that of Dr. Ariga, while later on Dr. Hirai and Mr. Nakayama were appointed to the Ministry of Communications.

"It was considered that the demand that Japanese should be appointed in the three most important administrative departments, as well as the demand for the joint control of China's police, and the demand for an engagement to purchase a fixed amount of arms and ammunitions from Japan or establish joint arsenals in China, so clearly involved the sovereignty of the Republic that the Chinese Government was unable even to consider them.

"For these reasons the Chinese Government, at the very outset of the negotiations, declared that they were unable to negotiate on the demands, but, in deference to the wishes of the Japanese Minister, the Chinese delegates consented to give the reasons for declining to enter into a discussion of them."

Having finished the analysis of the demands, I am going to describe the conditions of negotiations between the two countries. "China approached the pending conferences in utmost friendliness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17, twenty-four conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concession possible."⁸

At the beginning of negotiations, the Japanese Minister demanded that Chinese officials should in the main agree to all the demands, but China refused. On February 12, the Chinese Government submitted an official statement expressing its opinion of each demand and its willingness to agree to twelve of the twenty-one. On February

20th, the Japanese Minister still insisted upon the whole 21 demands as the basis for negotiations. On February 25th and 28th, the Chinese pointed out that in Inner Mongolia, unlike in Manchuria, special privileges could not be granted to Japan. Early in March, the Chinese acceded to the demands for the extension of the lease in South Manchuria, and also agreed to the principle, with some modification, concerning loans, mining rights, and advisers in South Manchuria. Later in March, China declared her willingness to agree to the demands to permit Japan to settle and own land in the interior of Eastern Inner Mongolia and South Manchuria, if the Japanese would be subjected to Chinese jurisdiction. At this time, the Japanese began to dispatch troops not only to Manchuria, but also to Shantung, Hankow, and other places.

At the fourteenth conference, the Chinese Government professed to agree in principle, but not in detail, to the demands concerning the Hayelping Company. With regard to the fourth group, China agreed that she would not alienate any island, port, or harbor on the coast to any third power, but offered to make declaration on her own responsibility, however not agreeing that Japan had any special right to require such declaration. At this conference, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs explained to the Japanese Minister why China was unwilling to let the Japanese missionaries carry their propaganda into China. During the next conferences, they discussed the question of the residence of Japanese in South Manchuria. Moreover, Mr. Hioki suggested that China should make railway concession in the Yangtze Valley to the Japanese, and allow Japan to settle with Great Britain. No conferences were held between April 17 and April 29, because Japan waited to find out what the reply of Sir Edward Grey to the British House of Commons would be.

On April 23, the Japanese Minister presented a revised list of twenty-four demands announcing that this communication was final. The articles are enumerated as follows:

Group I.

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government, relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions, which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

Article 2. (changed into an exchange of notes) The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of Shantung and along the coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext.

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow, to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan.

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports.

(Supplementary exchange of notes)

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a decision.

Group II.

Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that

that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway, shall be extended to 99 years.

(Supplementary exchange of notes)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12, in the original South Manchuria Railway Agreement that it may be redeemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened, is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007.

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subject shall be allowed to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding two articles, besides being required to register with local authorities, passports which they must procure under the existing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordinances and tax regulations, which are approved by the Japanese consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese consul; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese authorities. In either case an office can be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases between Chinese

and Japanese relating to land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations co-jointly, in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. When the judicial system in said region is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by the Chinese law courts.

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then prospect for and open mines at the following places in South Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in which mines are being prospected for or worked; until the mining ordinance is definitely settled, methods at present in force shall be followed:

Province of Feng-tien

LOCALITY	DISTRICT	MINERAL
Niu Hsin Tai	Pen-hsi	Coal
Tien Shih Fu Kou	Pen-hsi	"
Sha Sung Kang	Hai-lung	"
T'ieh Ch'ang	T'ung-hua	"
Nuan Ti T'ang	Chin	"
An Shan Chan region	From Liao-yang to Pen-hsi	Iron

Province of Kirin (Southern portion)

Sha Sung Kang	Ho-lung	Coal and iron
Kang Yao	Chi-lin (Kirin)	Coal
Chin P'i Kou	Hua-tien	Gold.

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria; if foreign capital is required the Chinese Government agrees to negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Article 5 a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a foreign

loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the security of which loans have already been made by the Central Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will be employed first.

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan agreements made heretofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in the existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes.

Chines Counter-Proposal to Article 7.

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this convention, remain in force.

Matters Relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of eastern inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Government first.

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself provide funds for building the railways in eastern inner Mongolia; if foreign capital required, she must negotiate with the Japanese

Government first.

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, as soon as possible, certain places suitable in eastern inner Mongolia as commercial ports. The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese minister must be consulted before making a decision.

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission.

Group III.

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company being very intimate, if the interested party of the said company comes to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for cooperation, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The Chinese Government further agrees that without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not convert the company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese.

Article IV.

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with the following principle:

No bay, harbor, or island along the coast of China may be ceded or leased to any Power.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED.

A.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang-Hangchow Rail-

way, and the Nanchang-Chaochow Railway, if it clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant the said right to Japan.

B.

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang to connect with the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not grant the said right to any foreign Power before Japan comes to an understanding with the other Power which is heretofore interested therein.

Notes to be Exchanged.

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, a Dockyard, a coaling station for military use, or a navy base, nor to be authorized to set up any other military establishment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to use foreign capital for setting up the above mentioned constructions or establishments.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows:

1. The Chinese Government shall, however, in the future, if it considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese Advisers.
2. Whenever, in the future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its consent thereto.
3. When the suitable opportunity arises in the future, the Chinese Government will send military Authorities to Japan to negotiate with Japanese military authorities in the matter of purchasing arms or that of establishing a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows:

As relates to the question of the right of missionary propaganda, the same shall be taken up again for negotiation in the future.

When the Japanese Minister presented this revised list to the Chinese Government, he declared that if China could consent to the whole group without revision, Japan would restore Kiaochow to China at an opportune time and subject to certain conditions. In this revision, it was found that all the items of the original group V. still appeared in one form or another, although this group had been explained as only representing wishes.

In the reply to the revised demands, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs read a memorandum containing a resume of what had been China's attitude and a summary of the concessions which had been made in the course of the negotiation.⁹ This memorandum declared

"As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe on China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other powers, or the principle of equal opportunity.....Accordingly, China has declared from the very beginning that while she entertains the most profound regard for Japan's wishes she was unable to admit that any of this matter could be made the subject of an understanding with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regards to Japan's wishes, China can not but respect her own sovereign rights and the existing treaties with other powers. In order to be rid of the seed for the future misunderstanding and to strengthen the basis of the friendship, China was constrained to iterate the reasons for refusing in the fifth group, yet in view of Japan's wishes, China had expressed her readi-

ness to state that no foreign money was borrowed to construct harbor works in Fukien Province."

The Japanese Minister replied at once and withdrew the promises for the restoration of Kiaochow. The Japanese Government prepared an ultimatum which was delivered to their Minister in Peking on May 6th. The Chinese people urged their government to resist Japan, if necessary, by force of arms but Yuan Shi-Kai, knowing that such a course would be futile, authorized his ministers to make further concessions. The Japanese refused any more discussion, and presented the ultimatum on May 7th, giving China forty-eight hours to reply to the demands. The important features of the ultimatum are as follows:

"The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present negotiation with the Chinese Government is first to endeavor to dispose of the complications arising out of the war between Japan and Germany, and secondly to attempt to solve those various questions which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship subsisting between the two countries to the end that the peace of the Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese Government in January of this year, and up to today as many as twenty-five conferences have been held with the Chinese Government in perfect sincerity and frankness....."

"On the first of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, contrary to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised proposals but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese Government to

restore Kiaochoow to them did not manifest the least appreciation for Japan's good will.

"So in spite of this ungratefulness, they reconsidered the feelings of the government of their neighboring country and, with the exception of the article relating to Fukien, which is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has already been agreed upon by the representatives of both nations, undertake to detach the Group V. from the present negotiation and discuss it separately in the future. Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately accepting without any alteration, all the articles of Groups I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien province in Group V. as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

"The Imperial Government hereby again offers its advice and hopes that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock p.m. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that, if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary." ¹⁰

At this moment, Japan decided to prepare to win her desires by force. General Oka, Minister of War, at once conferred with General Akashi, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, and in a few hours Japan was mobilizing her war fleet as well as her troops, in preparation for an invasion of China. The Thirteenth Division and South Manchurian Guards at Mukden and Liaoyoung began preparations to contend with the Chinese Twenty-Seventh and Twenty-Eighth Divisions. The advance guard moved to confront the Chinese Fifth Division. The

10. The Chinese Official Statement. pp. 39-43.

Japanese cruisers were ordered to the Gulf of Chili to pick up the Japanese Minister from Peking. China at the same time had a difficult question before her. She realized that she was not strong enough and powerful enough to contend with Japan. If war came about, she would lose more. Moreover, she saw clearly that the demands of the ultimatum contained little of importance to which China had not already agreed. The most drastic demands in the fifth group such as the employment of advisers, the establishing of schools and hospitals, the railway concessions in South China, the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishing of arsenals, and the propaganda of Buddhism, were to be postponed for later negotiation. Furthermore, if the Chinese Government accepted the demands of the ultimatum, the Japanese Government would restore Kiaochow with certain conditions.

Under these circumstances, Yuan chose the wise course. He conceded what he had to and made such exception as he could, hoping that China would get a hearing before civilization later. Moreover, China hoped for the intervention of other powers, but the help did not arrive. China was forced to agree to Japan's demands. "At half past one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, May 9th, China, the oldest nation in the world, passed under the virtual domination of Japan."¹¹

11. Jones: The Fall of Tsingtau. p. 207.

Chapter V.

Conclusion.

I have shown that Japan absorbed Corea, step by step stealing from China; I have shown that Japan usurped South Manchuria and discriminated against the other nations; I have shown that Japan violated the Chinese neutrality in Shantung; and I have shown and set forth at length the nature of the Japanese demands. The position of Japan towards China in their own eyes is that "of magnanimous liberators who have saved her from servitude to Europeans, of wise teachers who have imported to her the lessons necessary for her regeneration, of kindly guides who will direct her footsteps along the paths that lead to future greatness." But, in the eyes of the Chinese, they look at the matter differently: "It was Japan, they say, that first exposed their weakness to the world, that robbed them of Formosa and deprived them of their ancient suzerainty over Corea, which state she has now seized for herself, her action in repelling the Russians was due to selfish motives."¹ Furthermore, China sees in Japan an aggressor and menace. China recognizes the imperialistic ambitions of her neighbor and truly knows that it is natural for Japan to strive to become greater by securing a firm footing on the continent of Asia before being able to accomplish her ideal. If Japan pursues her present policy unmodified, the conflict between the oriental countries will be as sure as fate. In my conclusion, I may say that the peace or war of the future Far East will depend more or less upon the degree of Japan's ambition.

1. Coolidge: The United States as a World Power. p. 367.

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
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